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Symposium:  Money in Politics:   
The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly 
Articles and Speeches 
CONTRIBUTION LIMITS AFTER 
McCUTCHEON V. FEC 
James Bopp, Jr., Randy Elf, and Anita Y. Milanovich* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
With McCutcheon v. FEC having struck down particular contribution 
limits, this Article addresses two issues.1  Part II addresses the 
constitutionality of limits on contributions for independent spending for 
political speech, which Buckley v. Valeo calls “independent 
contributions[,]” while Part III addresses what Buckley calls “direct[]” 
contributions to candidates.2  Each presents important issues under the 
Constitution. 
II.  LIMITS ON CONTRIBUTIONS FOR INDEPENDENT SPENDING 
A. Quid Pro Quo Corruption or its Appearance 
Applying the First Amendment, the United States Supreme Court 
has long recognized that the only interest which suffices to ban, or 
otherwise limit, political speech is the prevention of corruption of 
                                                 
* James Bopp, Jr., has a national federal and state election law practice.  He is General 
Counsel for the James Madison Center for Free Speech, former Co-Chairman of the Free 
Speech and Election Law practice group of the Federalist Society, and special counsel to the 
Republican National Committee.  Mr. Bopp was lead counsel for plaintiffs Shaun 
McCutcheon and the Republican National Committee in the McCutcheon case that is the 
subject of this Article.  Randy Elf, who contributed to Part II to this Article, has been a 
teacher, an assistant to authors and lecturers Russell Kirk and Annette Kirk, a newspaper 
reporter, a law clerk to two federal judges, and a lawyer, and lives in Jamestown, New 
York.  Anita Y. Milanovich is an associate at The Bopp Law Firm and graduated from 
Valparaiso University Law School.  She assisted Mr. Bopp with Part III of this Article.  For 
more pieces from the symposium, see Valparaiso University Law School Symposium:  Money in 
Politics:  The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. (2015). 
1 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1440–42, 1461–62 (2014). 
2 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23–24 n.24, 61, 82 n.109 (1976). 
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candidates or officeholders, or the appearance of corruption.3  Citizens 
United v. FEC reaffirms this by addressing a ban on spending for political 
speech and holding “independent expenditures . . . do not give rise to 
corruption or the appearance of corruption.”4 
Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom PAC v. Bennett (AFEC) further 
reaffirms this and holds that when spending for political speech is 
independent, the “candidate-funding circuit is broken.”5  AFEC 
understates its point here:  when such spending is independent, there is no 
corrupting link to candidates or officeholders.6  It is not that the 
corrupting link is “broken”—it just is not there.7 
Independent expenditures—i.e., noncoordinated Buckley v. Valeo 
express advocacy—are the highest grade of independent spending for 
political speech.8  So when a person’s independent expenditures “do not 
give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption[,]” no 
independent spending for political speech by the same person “give[s] 
rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”9  Thus, a person who 
has a First Amendment right to engage in independent expenditures has 
a First Amendment right to engage in any independent spending for 
political speech.   
Furthermore, when “Buckley identified a . . . government[] interest in 
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was 
limited to quid pro quo corruption.”10  Influence, access, favoritism, and 
gratitude/ingratiation are not quid pro quo corruption or its appearance.11  
                                                 
3 As opposed to regulate, by requiring disclosure.  Yamada v. Kuramoto, 744 F. Supp. 2d 
1075, 1082 n.9 (D. Haw. 2010), appeal dismissed, No.10-17280 (9th Cir. June 10, 2011); FEC v. 
Nat’l Conservative PAC (NCPAC), 470 U.S. 480, 496–97 (1985) (citing Citizens Against Rent 
Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 300 (1981); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45); see Citizens 
Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 297 (referring to candidates and officeholders). 
4 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010). 
5 Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom PAC v. Bennett (AFEC), 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2826–27 
(2011) (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357, 360). 
6 See id. (holding that independent spending does not cause corruption or its 
appearance). 
7 Id. at 2826.  See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356–61 (holding that independent 
spending does not cause corruption or its appearance). 
8 “Independent expenditure” means Buckley v. Valeo express advocacy that is not 
coordinated with a candidate.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 & n.52, 46–47, 78, 80 (1976).  
Thus, noncoordinated spending for political speech that is not Buckley express advocacy is 
independent spending but not an independent expenditure.  See id. at 44 & n.52, 80 (defining 
express advocacy and thereby independent expenditure). 
9 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357 (quoted in AFEC, 131 S. Ct. at 2826). 
10 Id. at 359 (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 296–98 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part)); FEC v. NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985) (“The hallmark of 
corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors.”). 
11 Citizens United, 558 U.S at 359–60. 
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Transparency does not suffice, nor is what “the public may believe” the 
quid pro quo-corruption-or-its-appearance yardstick.12 
These Citizens United holdings are binding, even if lower courts 
disagree with them.13  Those who believe independent spending for 
political speech causes quid pro quo corruption or its appearance must 
also believe, contrary to Citizens United and AFEC, that government may 
ban, or otherwise limit, such spending to prevent quid pro quo corruption 
or its appearance.14  “Hence their objection is not [just] to Citizens United 
but to constitutional protection of advocacy-funding practices that are as 
old as the Republic.”15 
B. McCutcheon Raises the Bar 
Any doubt that these principles apply not just to spending for 
political speech but also to contributions is gone after McCutcheon, under 
which government may ban, or otherwise limit, contributions or spending 
only to prevent “‘quid pro quo’ corruption or its appearance[,]” with quid 
pro quo corruption now meaning only “a direct exchange of an official act 
for money.”16  No “other objectives” suffice.17  Courts “drawing” this 
“line” “err on the side of protecting political speech[.]”18 
                                                 
12 Ala. Democratic Conference v. Broussard, 541 F. App’x 931, 933 (11th Cir. 2013) 
(unpublished).  Contra id. at 935.  Public-opinion polls do not determine constitutional law.  
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. 137, 176 (1803); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824)); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 
237, 254 (1991) (quoting Dowell v. Bd. of Educ., 338 F. Supp. 1256, 1270 (W.D. Okla. 1972)); 
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 377 (1989), abrogated on other grounds, Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005).  Cf. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 400 (1991) (stating 
that “public opinion should be irrelevant to the judge’s role because the judge is often 
called upon to disregard, or even to defy, popular sentiment” and that because the 
“[f]ramers of the Constitution had a similar understanding of the judicial role, . . . they 
established that Article III judges would be appointed, rather than elected, and would be 
sheltered from public opinion by receiving life tenure and salary protection”). 
 If public-opinion polls determined constitutional law—as Stop this Insanity, Inc. 
Employee Leadership Fund v. FEC asserts—the Brown v. Board of Education plaintiffs would 
have lost.  Stop this Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund v. FEC, 902 F. Supp. 2d 23, 44 
n.24 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d on other grounds, Stop this Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund 
v. FEC, 761 F.3d 10 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 949 (2015); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 
347 U.S. 483, 493–95 (1954). 
13 See Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 1307, 1308 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring) (holding that “lower courts are bound to follow” Citizens United). 
14 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356–61; AFEC, 131 S. Ct. at 2826–27. 
15 George Will, Montana Attempts to Buck the Supreme Court on Citizens United, WASH. 
POST (May 30, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/montana-attempts-to-
buck-the-supreme-court-on-citizens-united/2012/05/30/gJQA4DCi2U_story.html?wprss= 
rss_george-will, archived at http://perma.cc/8VYA-7XZQ. 
16 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014) (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 
359; citing McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 266 (1991)).  This is “an effort to 
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No “conjecture”—including about “recontributed funds” or 
contributions “rerouted to candidates”—suffices.19 To limit 
contributions, government must show they are in turn “used for” 
contributions, i.e., “are directed . . . to a candidate or officeholder.”20  
When government shows no such McCutcheon “exchange” or its 
“appearance[,]” much less any exchange or its appearance involving 
“large” or “massive” contributions to candidates, contribution limits are 
unconstitutional, at least as applied, regardless of whether strict scrutiny 
or closely-drawn exacting scrutiny applies, although strict scrutiny is 
preferable.21 
                                                                                                             
control the exercise of an officeholder’s official duties”—i.e., “an act akin to bribery.”  Id. at 
1450; id. at 1466 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Although government may “limit ‘the appearance 
of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a 
regime of large . . . financial contributions’ to particular candidates . . . [g]overnment’s 
interest in preventing the appearance of corruption is equally confined to the appearance of 
quid pro quo corruption[.]”  Id. at 1450–51 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976)). 
17 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441 (citing AFEC, 131 S. Ct. at 2826). 
18 Id. at 1451 (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL-II), 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007)). 
19 Id. at 1452, 1457 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 392 (2000)). 
20 Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1090–91 (10th Cir. 2013) (“limits on 
contributions to political committees that are to be used for independent expenditures” 
(emphasis added)), id. at 1092 (“the court concluded, as has nearly every circuit court since 
Citizens United, there could be no anti-corruption interest in limiting contributions to be 
used for such expenditures” (emphasis added)); id. at 1093 n.2 (“limits on contributions to 
PACs for the purpose of making independent expenditures are unconstitutional even 
under a lower level of scrutiny”); id. at 1096 (“limits on contributions for the purpose of 
making independent expenditures promote no anti-corruption interest”); id. at 1103 
(holding law “unconstitutional as applied to contributions to those organizations to be 
used solely for independent expenditures”).  McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452 (quoting 
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 310 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part)). 
21 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441, 1450–53 (citations omitted); see id. at 1445–46 (holding 
that the plaintiffs prevail either way).  Under strict scrutiny, a court first asks whether there 
is a compelling government interest in regulating the speech, and only if there is does a 
court ask whether the law is “narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”  WRTL-II, 551 U.S. 
at 464 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978)) (quoted in 
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010)). 
 Meanwhile, “closely[-]drawn” exacting scrutiny is different.  Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 
387–88 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16, 25 (1976)).  A court first asks whether there 
is a “sufficiently important” government interest in regulating the speech, and only if there 
is does a court ask whether the law is “closely drawn” to achieve that interest.  FEC v. Colo. 
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colo. Republican-II), 533 U.S. 431, 446 (2001) (quoting 
Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 387–88).  McCutcheon puts teeth into the phrase “closely drawn[.]”  
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1456.  The Court states: 
In the First Amendment context, fit matters.  Even when the Court is 
not applying strict scrutiny, we still require “a fit that is not necessarily 
perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best 
disposition but one whose scope is ‘in proportion to the interest 
served,’ . . . that employs not necessarily the least restrictive 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 2 [2015], Art. 7
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C. The Next Questions 
Except for foreign nationals, the Supreme Court has held that 
government may not limit independent spending for political speech, 
including independent expenditures properly understood.22  The next 
questions are: (1) What does this mean for contributions received by 
organizations engaging in only independent spending for political 
speech?;23 (2) What does this mean for contributions received by 
organizations for independent spending when they both make 
contributions and engage in independent spending?;24 and (3) May 
government ever limit contributions for independent spending for 
political speech?  If so, when? 
The short answer is that regardless of the scrutiny level, the principle 
that independent spending for political speech does not “give rise to 
corruption or the appearance of corruption” applies when organizations 
                                                                                                             
means . . . but a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired 
objective.”  Here, because the statute is poorly tailored to the 
[g]overnment’s interest in preventing circumvention of the base limits, 
it impermissibly restricts participation in the political process. 
Id. at 1456–57 (quoting Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)) 
(citations omitted). 
Regardless of the scrutiny level, government must prove political-speech law survives 
scrutiny.  WRTL-II, 551 U.S. at 464 (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786); Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 
387–88 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25) (applying closely-drawn exacting scrutiny); see also 
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452 (discussing government’s burden to prove speech law 
survives scrutiny).  When government seeks to ban, or otherwise limit speech, government 
must prove quid pro quo corruption or its appearance.  See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 232 
(highlighting government’s burden to prove corruption or its appearance); see also 
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1462–65 (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing contributions and 
spending). 
22 Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 286–89 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d without op., Bluman v. 
FEC, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012).  A Supreme Court affirmance without an opinion, of a three-
judge district court judgment, affirms the judgment, not the reasoning.  Fusari v. Steinberg, 
419 U.S. 379, 391 & n.* (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring), adopted in Mandel v. Bradley, 432 
U.S. 173, 176 (1977).  E.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 336–66 (holding that government may 
not limit independent spending for political speech); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 240–46 
(2006) (holding that government may not limit independent spending for political speech); 
Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC (Colo. Republican-I), 518 U.S. 604, 613–20 
(1996) (holding that government may not limit independent spending for political speech); 
FEC v. NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480, 496–501 (1985) (holding that government may not limit 
independent spending for political speech); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44–51 (holding that 
government may not limit independent spending for political speech). 
23 Yamada v. Kuramoto, 744 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1083 (D. Haw. 2010), appeal dismissed, 
No.10-17280 (9th Cir. June 10, 2011). 
24 Cf. id. (addressing contributions received by organizations engaging in only 
independent spending). 
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engage in only independent spending.25  This principle also applies 
when organizations both make contributions and engage in independent 
spending.26  Before Citizens United, and particularly after Citizens United, 
limits on contributions for independent spending are unconstitutional 
when contributors are not foreign nationals.27  McCutcheon’s dictum 
regarding transfers “among candidates and political committees” does 
not support limiting contributions for independent spending, and 
extends beyond transfers and contributions used for independent 
spending.28 
Notwithstanding Second Circuit holdings, government may prevent 
“circumvention” but not with otherwise unconstitutional law.29  
                                                 
25 See Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1093 n.2 (holding that the plaintiffs prevail 
regardless of the scrutiny level); Wis. Right to Life State PAC v. Barland (Barland-I), 664 
F.3d 139, 154 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that the plaintiff prevails regardless of the scrutiny 
level); Yamada, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 1082–84 (holding that the plaintiffs prevail regardless of 
the scrutiny level).  Stop this Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund v. FEC incorrectly 
implies that the scrutiny level affects the result.  See 902 F. Supp. 2d 23, 38–39 n.18 (D.D.C. 
2012) (stating pre-McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1445–46, that because “any political contribution 
enjoys . . . lesser . . . First Amendment protection than any . . . political expenditure, . . . 
Buckley . . . was ultimately untroubled by limits on political contributions because the 
overall effect of contribution limits ‘is merely to require candidates and political 
committees to raise funds from a greater number of persons’”); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 
357 (quoted in AFEC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2826 (2011)) (holding that independent 
spending does not cause corruption or its appearance).  See, e.g., Republican Party of N.M., 
741 F.3d at 1095–97 (holding that independent spending does not cause corruption or its 
appearance); Barland-I, 664 F.3d at 151–55 (holding that independent spending does not 
cause corruption or its appearance); Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of 
Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684, 695 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 392 (2010) (“Supreme 
Court precedent forecloses the . . . argument that independent expenditures by 
independent[-]expenditure committees . . . raise the specter of corruption or the appearance 
thereof.”); Yamada, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 1084 (holding that independent spending does not 
cause corruption or its appearance). 
26 See, e.g., Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1097 (explaining that government may 
limit contributions that are, in turn, used for contributions yet not contributions that are, in 
turn, used for independent spending); Emily’s List v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(explaining that government may limit contributions that are, in turn, used for 
contributions yet not contributions that are, in turn, used for independent spending). 
27 See Emily’s List, 581 F.3d at 9–12 (rejecting a limit on contributions for independent 
spending pre-Citizens United); N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake (NCRL-III), 525 F.3d 274, 291-
95 (4th Cir. 2008) (rejecting a limit on contributions for independent spending pre-Citizens 
United); see also Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1093 n.2, 1095–97 (rejecting a limit on 
contributions for independent spending post-Citizens United); Barland-I, 664 F.3d at 151–55 
(rejecting a limit on contributions for independent spending post-Citizens United); Yamada, 
744 F. Supp. 2d at 1083–84 (rejecting a limit on contributions for independent spending 
post-Citizens United); Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 285–89 (upholding a ban on contributions 
and independent expenditures by foreign nationals). 
28 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1458–59 (2014). 
29 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452–60; see Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 
118, 140 n.20 (2d Cir. 2014) (VRLC-II), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 949 (2015) (citing Ognibene v. 
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Preventing “circumvention” cannot justify otherwise unconstitutional 
law.30  This is because “there can be no freestanding anti-circumvention 
interest.”31  In other words, “anti-circumvention is not an independent 
state interest.”32  This applies to contribution limits and beyond.33  The 
fact that “speakers find ways to circumvent campaign[-]finance laws” 
does not mean preventing circumvention can justify unconstitutional 
law.34  Otherwise, government could justify limits on contributions to 
one’s own campaign, banning contributions by minors, unconstitutional 
Randall v. Sorrell-like limits, or aggregate contribution limits by somehow 
preventing “circumvention” of the same or other limits.35  This is 
                                                                                                             
Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 194–95 (2d Cir. 2012)) (holding that contribution limits “could be 
justified as preventing circumvention of contribution limits”). 
30 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452–60. 
31 Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1102. 
32 Landell v. Sorrell, 406 F.3d 159, 169 (2d Cir. 2005), rev’d on other grounds, 548 U.S. 230, 
246–62 (2006) (Walker, J., dissenting) (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 161 (2003)). 
 Even pre-McCutcheon Supreme Court opinions rely on an “anti-circumvention” 
rationale to uphold contribution limits only when they are “otherwise valid[.]”  McConnell, 
540 U.S. at 138 n.40, 185 (citing FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 161–62 (2003)) (referring to 
“circumvention of otherwise [valid] contribution limits”); see id. at 205 (referring to 
“circumvention of valid contribution limits” (brackets omitted)) (quoting Beaumont, 539 
U.S. at 155, quoting, in turn, FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 
456 n.18 (2001)); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 259 (2006) (quoting Colo. Republican-II, 533 
U.S. at 453); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 126, 129, 134, 137, 139, 144, 145, 163, 165, 170, 171–72, 
174, 176 (quoting Colo. Republican-II, 533 U.S. at 453, 456); Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 160 & n.7; 
Colo. Republican-II, 533 U.S. at 446, 453, 455, 457 & n.19, 460 & n.23, 461, 464 & n.28 (quoting 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976)); Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 197–98 & n.18 
(1981). 
 They are otherwise valid only if they prevent quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, 
with quid pro quo corruption now defined as “a direct exchange of an official act for 
money.”  McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441 (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 
(2010)).  See Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 736–44 (2008) (considering only corruption).  See, 
e.g., Randall, 548 U.S. at 241–42, 244–45, 246–49; Colo. Republican-II, 533 U.S. at 441, 444–45, 
456; Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 388–96 (2000); FEC v. Nat’l Right to 
Work, 459 U.S. 197, 208–10 (1982); Cal. Med. Ass’n, 453 U.S. at 195, 197–99; McCutcheon, 134 
S. Ct. at 1441 (citing McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 266 (1991)).  This is “an 
effort to control the exercise of an officeholder’s official duties,” i.e., “an act akin to 
bribery.”  McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450; id. at 1466 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
33 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44–48 (applying this principle to contributions and 
independent spending). 
34 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364 (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 176–77). 
35 Contra Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51–54 (holding that limits on contributions to one’s own 
campaign are unconstitutional); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 232 (holding a ban on contributions 
by minors unconstitutional); Randall, 548 U.S. at 246–62 (holding a limit on contributions 
unconstitutional); McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452–60 (holding aggregate contribution limits 
unconstitutional). 
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contrary to the principle that contribution limits must rise or fall on their 
own merits.36 
To put it another way:  on the one hand, when law is constitutional, 
there is nothing wrong with legally circumventing it; however, there is 
something wrong with illegally circumventing it.  This is the difference 
between avoiding and evading taxes—avoiding taxes is legal, while 
evading them is not.37  On the other hand, when a court enjoins 
unconstitutional law, government may not enforce it, and there is 
nothing wrong with circumventing it.   
D. Organizations Engaging in Only Independent Spending 
The District of Columbia Circuit holds that government may never 
limit contributions to organizations engaging in only independent 
spending.38  A Supreme Court concurrence agrees.39  This is the 
controlling opinion in California Medical Association v. FEC.40  The Fourth 
Circuit also agrees, holding that “contribution limits are . . . unacceptable 
when applied to . . . independent[-]expenditure committees[.]”41  The 
organizations “furthest removed from the candidate” are those that 
engage in only independent spending.42  It “is ‘implausible’ that 
contributions to independent[-]expenditure political committees are 
corrupting.”43  The Seventh and Tenth Circuits resoundingly agree.44  
                                                 
36 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452–60; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 232; Randall, 548 U.S. at 246–
62; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51–54. 
37 THE LAW DICTIONARY, What is Tax Avoidance?, available at 
http://thelawdictionary.org/tax-avoidance (last visited Feb. 13, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/R9JR-U32Y. 
38 SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 694–95 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 
S. Ct. 553 (2010); see Emily’s List, 581 F.3d at 9–11, 14–15 & n.13, 15–16 n.14 (holding that 
government may not limit contributions to organizations engaging in only independent 
spending). 
39 See Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 203 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating 
that “contributions to a committee that makes only independent expenditures pose 
no . . . threat . . . of actual or potential corruption”). 
40 Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1099 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing Marks v. 
United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)); Emily’s List, 581 F.3d at 9 n.8 (citing Marks, 430 U.S. 
at 193). 
41 NCRL-III v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 292–93 (4th Cir. 2008). 
42 Id. at 293. 
43 Id. (quoting N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake (NCRL-II), 344 F.3d 418, 434 (4th Cir. 
2003), cert. granted and judgment vacated on other grounds, 541 U.S. 1007 (2004)). 
44 See Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1095–97 (holding that government may not 
limit contributions to organizations engaging in only independent spending); Wis. Right to 
Life State PAC v. Barland (Barland-I), 664 F.3d 139, 151–55 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that 
government may not limit contributions to organizations engaging in only independent 
spending).  Barland-I holds: 
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The Fifth Circuit holds not that a limit, but a source ban on contributions 
from corporations, and by extension unions, for independent spending is 
unconstitutional.45  The Ninth Circuit’s approach in effect closes the door 
on limiting contributions for independent spending except when 
contributors are foreign nationals.  The key to the inquiry is whether 
contributors themselves are “entitled to exercise individually” the First 
Amendment right to spending for political speech that they “enjoy and 
effectuate” by making contributions for independent spending.46  Only 
                                                                                                             
Wisconsin’s $10,000 aggregate annual contribution limit is 
unconstitutional as applied to organizations, like the [Wisconsin] Right 
to Life [State] PAC, that engage only in independent expenditures for 
political speech. This is true even though the statute limits 
contributions, not expenditures.  Whether strict scrutiny or the [exacting,] 
“closely drawn” standard applies, the anticorruption rationale cannot 
serve as a justification for limiting fundraising by groups that engage 
in independent spending on political speech.  No other justification for 
limits on political speech has been recognized, and none is offered 
here. 
Barland-I, 664 F.3d at 154 (emphasis in original).  Quoting Barland-I, Republican Party of New 
Mexico holds “there is no valid governmental interest sufficient to justify imposing limits 
on fundraising by independent-expenditure organizations.”  Republican Party of N.M., 741 
F.3d at 1095. 
45 Texans for Free Enter. v. Texas Ethics Comm’n, 732 F.3d 535, 536–37 (5th Cir. 2013).  
See Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 706 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1088 (S.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d 645 
F.3d 1109, 1118–21 (9th Cir. 2011) (ordering a preliminary injunction against, inter alia, a 
contribution-source ban).  Treating contributions by corporations and unions differently 
violates the Equal Protection Clause.  See Dallman v. Ritter, 225 P.3d 610, 634–35 (Colo. 
2010) (holding that there was no compelling government interest in treating corporations 
and unions differently).  Iowa Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Tooker held otherwise and left 
this question for the Supreme Court.  717 F.3d 576, 603 (IRLC-II) (8th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 
134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014).  Texans for Free Enter., 732 F.3d at 538. 
46 Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach holds organizations 
engaging in only independent spending: 
[P]rovide a distinct medium through which citizens may collectively 
enjoy and effectuate those expressive freedoms that they are entitled to 
exercise individually.  Many “individuals contribute to a political 
organization in part because they regard such a contribution as a more 
effective means of advocacy than spending the money under their own 
personal direction.”  Just as the soloist’s song becomes more powerful 
when joined by a chorus of people singing along, . . . citizen[s’] 
message[s] may become more widely and effectively disseminated 
when [t]he[y] join[] an [organization] of like-minded citizens. 
603 F.3d 684, 698 (9th Cir. 2010); see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44–51 (1976) (holding that 
government may not limit spending for political speech); see also Long Beach, 603 F.3d at 698 
(holding that government may not limit contributions to organizations engaging in only 
independent spending); Farris v. Seabrook, 677 F.3d 858, 867–68 n.8 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(applying Long Beach to recall elections); Thalheimer, 645 F.3d at 1118–21 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(holding that government may not limit contributions to organizations engaging in only 
independent spending); Yamada v. Kuramoto, 744 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1085–87 (D. Haw. 
2010), appeal dismissed, No.10-17280 (9th Cir. June 10, 2011) (applying Long Beach, granting a 
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when contributors are foreign nationals do they not have a First 
Amendment right to engage in the same speech as the “contributees.”47 
E. Organizations Making Contributions Too 
The Tenth and District of Columbia Circuits apply these same 
principles when organizations both make contributions and engage in 
independent spending for political speech from separate accounts. Each 
of these circuits holds limits on contributions that organizations receive 
for independent spending are unconstitutional.48 
How can quid pro quo corruption of candidates or officeholders, or its 
appearance, ever arise when organizations engaging in only independent 
spending for political speech receive contributions from persons who 
themselves have a First Amendment right to engage in the same speech 
as the organizations?  And how can quid pro quo corruption of candidates 
                                                                                                             
preliminary-injunction motion on an as-applied contribution-limit claim, and inadvertently 
rejecting a facial holding the plaintiffs did not seek); Yamada v. Weaver, 872 F. Supp. 2d 
1023, 1039–42 (D. Haw. 2012), appeal docketed on other grounds, No.12-15913 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 
2012) (granting summary judgment on the contribution-limit claim and correcting the 
previous holding). 
 Whether the person challenging a contribution limit is a contributor or a contributee is 
immaterial.  See, e.g., Yamada, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 1080–81 (addressing contributors); Barland-
I, 664 F.3d at 147 (addressing a contributee).  A contributor’s right to make contributions 
would be useless if a contributee lacked the right to receive them.  Similarly, a contributee’s 
right to receive contributions would be useless if a contributor lacked the right to make 
them—it would be like a beautiful car without gasoline.  Cf. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19 n.18 
(cited in Long Beach, 603 F.3d at 692) (comparing being “free to engage in unlimited political 
expression subject to a ceiling on expenditures” with “being free to drive an automobile as 
far and as often as one desires on a single tank of gasoline”). 
47 See supra notes 22, 27 and accompanying text (explaining that limits on contributions 
for independent spending are unconstitutional when the contributors are not foreign 
nationals).  Cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (2010) (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441e (now 
52 U.S.C. § 30121 (2012)) (stating the Court “need not reach the question of whether the 
[g]overnment has a compelling interest in preventing foreign individuals or associations 
from” making contributions or independent expenditures). 
48 Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1097 (10th Cir. 2013); Emily’s List v. 
FEC, 581 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  Republican Party of New Mexico states: 
If a contribution to outside groups for the purpose of making 
independent expenditures implicates the government’s anti-corruption 
interest, then the same interest is implicated by the independent 
expenditures themselves.  This would mean that “the entire Buckley 
edifice, built on a foundation of a contribution-expenditure dichotomy, 
falls.” Richard L. Hasen, Buckley Is Dead, Long Live Buckley:  The New 
Campaign Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election 
Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31, 70 (2004).  “Is that what the Court 
really intended buried in a few sentences of a footnote in one of the 
longest cases in Supreme Court history?” Id.  See also Emily’s List, 581 
F.3d at 14 n.13 (declining to adopt expansive reading of footnote 48). 
741 F.3d at 1100 n.7 (discussing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 152 n.48 (2003)). 
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or officeholders, or its appearance, ever arise when organizations making 
contributions and engaging in independent spending for political speech 
receive contributions for independent spending from persons who 
themselves have a First Amendment right to engage in the same speech 
as the organizations? 
Since there is no corrupting link between candidates or officeholders 
and organizations’ independent spending, the presence of contributions 
from persons who themselves have a First Amendment right to engage 
in the same speech as the organizations, cannot somehow create that 
missing corrupting link.  First, as a matter of law, organizations’ 
independent spending cannot be a “corrupt ‘quo’”; second, as a matter of 
law, contributions for organizations’ independent spending cannot be a 
“corrupting ‘quid[,]’” because only government officials have the power 
to grant corrupt or apparently corrupt “political favors.”49  Again, it is 
not that the corrupting link is “broken”—it is just not there.50  It does not 
matter whether the contribution limit is 1 cent, $1, $1000, or $1 million.51    
Except as to contributions from foreign nationals, contribution limits are 
unconstitutional per se as applied to contributions for independent 
spending, so government is without power to say how big is big 
enough.52  The size of the contribution limit is immaterial.53 
Even if a contributee has “interests closely aligned with a political 
party, this alignment would not change the analysis because, under 
                                                 
49 SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 694–95 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 553 
(2010) (followed in Wis. Right to Life State PAC v. Barland (Barland-I), 664 F.3d 139, 154 
(7th Cir. 2011)); see Emily’s List, 581 F.3d at 12 (explaining that government may limit 
contributions that are, in turn, used for contributions yet not contributions that are, in turn, 
used for independent spending); FEC v. NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985) (quoted in 
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010)).  The NCRL-III dissent—which VRLC-II 
follows—misses this by focusing on whether organizations can cause corruption or its 
appearance instead of whether particular speech can.  VRLC-II v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118, 141 
n.22 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 949 (2015).  Compare NCRL-III v. Leake, 525 F.3d 
274, 336 (4th Cir. 2008) (Michael, J., dissenting) (focusing on whether organizations are 
coordinated), with infra notes 86–87 and accompanying text (explaining that the question is 
not whether organizations are coordinated but whether the particular speech is 
coordinated with a candidate). 
50 AFEC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2826 (2011). 
51 See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1448 (2014) (quoting NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 493) 
(holding that “First Amendment rights are important regardless whether the individual is, 
on the one hand, a ‘lone pamphleteer or street corner orator in the Tom Paine mold,’ or is, 
on the other, someone who spends ‘substantial amounts of money in order to communicate 
his political ideas through sophisticated’ means” (brackets and ellipses omitted)). 
52 See supra notes 22, 27 and accompanying text (explaining that limits on contributions 
for independent spending are unconstitutional when the contributors are not foreign 
nationals). 
53 Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 50–54 (1976) (striking down limits on contributions 
made to one’s own campaign). 
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Supreme Court precedent, political parties [can] also make unlimited 
independent expenditures.”54  Republican Party of New Mexico v. King’s 
“caveat” about political parties’ receiving contributions for independent 
spending is dictum, because no political party even had a claim at stake 
in the Republican Party of New Mexico appeal, much less sought to receive 
unlimited contributions for independent spending.55 
Under McCutcheon, “the risk of quid pro quo corruption is generally 
applicable only to ‘the narrow category of money gifts that are 
directed . . . to a candidate or officeholder.’”56  That is not what happens 
when organizations use contributions for independent spending.57  
There is no “risk of” a “direct exchange of an official act for money.”58  
Such contributions are not “used for” contributions.59  They are not 
“directed . . . to a candidate or officeholder.”60  There is no McCutcheon 
exchange or its appearance, much less any involving “large” or 
“massive” contributions to candidates.61 
F. Circuit Splits 
Three circuit opinions have created circuit splits, with Vermont Right 
to Life Committee, Inc. v. Sorrell (VRLC-II) alone splitting in multiple 
                                                 
54 Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1091 (10th Cir. 2013) (recalling the 
district court’s holding). 
55 Id. at 1098–99, 1102–03; infra notes 129–132 and accompanying text.  Republican Party of 
N.M. 741 F.3d at 1091, 1092, 1097 (“only non-party political committees have challenged the 
constitutionality of the law as applied to them”).  By contrast, in Republican Nat’l Comm. v. 
FEC, political parties did challenge limits on contributions for independent spending.  
No.14-00853, VERIFIED COMPL. ¶¶1–5, 11–16 (D.D.C. May 23, 2014), voluntarily dismissed, 
(D.D.C. Dec. 3, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/V96J-3LWT.  However, the result would 
be the same, because political parties present no “special danger[] of [quid pro quo] 
corruption” or its appearance, so government may not limit contributions that political 
parties receive for independent spending.  Colo. Republican-I v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 616 
(1996).  And “the constitutionally significant fact” in assessing whether particular speech—
not the entire political-party organization, but the particular speech—is independent, “is 
the lack of coordination” with candidates.  Id. at 617. 
56 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 310 (2003) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
57 Anyway, “there is not the same risk of quid pro quo corruption or its appearance when 
money flows through independent actors to a candidate, as when a donor contributes to a 
candidate directly.”  Id. 
58 Id. at 1441, 1452 (citing McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 266 (1991)).  There is 
no “effort to control the exercise of an officeholder’s official duties,” i.e., no “act akin to 
bribery.”  Id. at 1450; id. 1466 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
59 See supra note 20 (quoting Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1091–93 
n.2 (10th Cir. 2013)) (holding that government may not limit contributions that are “used 
for” independent spending, even when the contributee also makes contributions). 
60 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452. 
61 Id. at 1441, 1450–53 (citations omitted). 
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ways.62  First, the plaintiff-contributee, Vermont Right to Life Committee 
Fund for Independent Political Expenditures (“VRLC-FIPE”), is a 
political committee connected to Vermont Right to Life Committee, Inc. 
(“VRLC”).63  VRLC-II finds VRLC-FIPE is part of one organization with 
another political committee, Vermont Right to Life Committee—Political 
Committee (“VRLC-PC”), which makes contributions.64  VRLC-II 
expressly splits with North Carolina Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Leake 
(NCRL-III).  NCRL-III addresses parallel North Carolina organizations 
and holds NCRL-FIPE is “independent as a matter of law” from NCRL 
and NCRL-PAC.65  As a matter of law, a political committee that an 
organization forms/has is a legal person unto itself; it is not part of 
another organization—its speech is its own.66 
Second, VRLC-II addresses “circumvention of contribution limits” 
without acknowledging that government may prevent “circumvention” 
but not with otherwise unconstitutional law.67  In other words, 
preventing “circumvention” cannot justify otherwise unconstitutional 
law.68  VRLC-II splits with Republican Party of New Mexico’s holding that 
“there can be no freestanding anti-circumvention interest.”69 
Third, VRLC-II holds the government may limit contributions to 
organizations making contributions and may not limit contributions to 
organizations engaging in only independent spending.70  However, even 
conceding arguendo all of Defendants’ asserted undisputed facts, 
including that VRLC-FIPE and VRLC-PC are one organization and that 
                                                 
62 VRLC-II v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118, 139–45 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 949 (2015). 
63 VRLC is not a political committee and challenges Vermont law requiring it to be one.  
Id. at 135–39. 
64 See id. at 140, 142, 143–44 (describing the organizations). 
65 Id. at 141 (quoting NCRL-III v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 294 n.8 (4th Cir. 2008)). 
66 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 337 (2010) (holding that a political committee 
that an organization forms/has “is a separate association from the” organization); Cal. 
Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 196 (1981) (holding that a political committee that an 
organization forms/has “is a separate legal entity” from the organization).  Alaska Right to 
Life Committee v. Miles (ARLC) implicitly recognizes this even when “three entities share the 
same director and the same board of directors” and the “degree of financial separation 
among the three entities is unclear from the record.”  441 F.3d 773, 776 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. 
denied, 549 U.S. 886 (2006).  Claiming that a political committee that an organization 
forms/has “is merely the mouthpiece” of another organization “is untenable.”  Cal. Med. 
Ass’n, 453 U.S. at 196.  The fact that another organization “agree[s] with the views” of the 
political committee “does not convert” the political committee’s “speech into that of” the 
other organization.  Id. 
67 VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 140 n.20; McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1452–60 (2014). 
68 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452–60. 
69 Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 761 F.3d 1089, 1102 (10th Cir. 2013). 
70 VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 139 (quoting Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 140 (2d Cir. 2004), 
rev’d on other grounds, 548 U.S. 230 (2006)); id. at 140 (citing New York Progress & Protection 
PAC v. Walsh, 733 F.3d 483, 487 (2d Cir. 2013)). 
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VRLC-FIPE “is completely enmeshed with VRLC-PC[,]” VRLC-II does 
not recognize a crucial point.71  It does not recognize that organizations 
that both make contributions and engage in independent spending—as 
the alleged “single” VRLC-FIPE and VRLC-PC organization does—may 
receive unlimited contributions for independent spending.72  The 
organization “merely needs to ensure that its contributions to parties 
[other than for independent spending] or candidates come from an 
account set up for that purpose, not one used for independent 
expenditures.”73  VRLC-PC and VRLC-FIPE have separate accounts, just 
as a victorious Republican Party of New Mexico plaintiff does.74  Thus, 
VRLC-II splits with Republican Party of New Mexico and Emily’s List v. 
FEC.75 
Fourth, along that same line and most importantly, even conceding 
arguendo all of Defendants’ asserted undisputed facts, including that 
VRLC-FIPE and VRLC-PC are one organization and that VRLC-FIPE “is 
enmeshed completely with VRLC-PC[,]” VRLC-FIPE still prevails 
because Defendants did not prove any contribution VRLC-FIPE receives 
is “used for” anything other than independent spending for political 
speech.76  That, not Defendants’ facts, is the crucial—and now a circuit-
splitting—question.  Defendants never responded to, much less 
                                                 
71 Id. at 141–44. 
72 See id. at 140–41 (recognizing only “independent-expenditure-only” organizations).  
VRLC-II implies they may not, and this is at the heart of the VRLC-II circuit split.  See id. at 
141 (citing Stop this Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund v. FEC, 902 F. Supp. 2d 23, 43 
(D.D.C. 2012) (holding that “separate bank account[s]”—which VRLC-FIPE and VRLC-PC 
have—do “not prevent coordinated expenditures”); id. at 144 (finding “VRLC-FIPE is not 
meaningfully distinct from VRLC-PC” and therefore affirming summary judgment on the 
contribution limit).  But preventing organizations’ coordinated spending—i.e., 
contributions—is unnecessary for the organizations to receive unlimited contributions for 
independent spending.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46–47, 78 (1976); Republican Party of 
N.M., 741 F.3d at 1097; Emily’s List v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  Instead, the 
relevant inquiry is whether Defendants proved any contribution VRLC-FIPE receives is 
used for anything other than independent spending for political speech.  Infra notes 76–77 
and accompanying text. 
73 Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1097 (citing Emily’s List, 581 F.3d at 12). 
74 VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 143; Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1097. 
75 Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1097; VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 141 (citing Emily’s List, 
581 F.3d at 12). 
76 VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 141–44 & n.23 (finding that “the record does not show that funds 
from VRLC-FIPE were used for candidate contributions”); see supra note 20 (quoting 
Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1091, 1092, 1093 n.2 (10th Cir. 2013) 
(holding that government may not limit contributions that are “used for” independent 
spending, even when the contributee also makes contributions);  see also Republican Party of 
N.M., 741 F.3d at 1096 (“contributions for the purpose of making independent 
expenditures”); id. at 1103 (“used solely for”).  Cf. Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 203 
(1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that “contributions to a committee that makes 
only independent expenditures pose no . . . threat . . . of actual or potential corruption”). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 2 [2015], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss2/7
2015] Contribution Limits After McCutcheon v. FEC 375 
disputed, this. What remains is “conjecture” regarding “recontributed 
funds” or contributions “rerouted to candidates[.]”77 
Indeed, VRLC-II acknowledges “that the record does not show that 
funds from VRLC-FIPE were used for candidate contributions.”78  
However, VRLC-II means only direct contributions to candidates.79  Yet 
Defendants also did not prove any contribution VRLC-FIPE receives is 
“used for” any indirect contribution to candidates, i.e., contributions to 
candidates via intermediaries or spending for political speech 
coordinated with candidates.80  By nevertheless holding that Vermont 
may limit contributions that VRLC-FIPE receives, VRLC-II splits with 
Republican Party of New Mexico and Emily’s List.81 
Holding that mere voter guides are coordinated spending splits with 
Clifton v. FEC, because “coordination” implies “collaboration beyond” 
                                                 
77 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1452, 1457 (2014) (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. 
Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 392 (2000)). 
78 VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 143 n.23 (finding that “the record does not show that funds from 
VRLC-FIPE were used for candidate contributions”); cf. id. at 143 (explaining voter guides 
and fundraising).  VRLC-II finds this even while finding “fluidity of funds between VRLC-
FIPE and VRLC-PC.”  Id. at 143.  The reason is that the “fluidity” Defendants allege all 
flows from VRLC and VRLC-PC (which makes contributions) to VRLC-FIPE (which does 
not), not vice-versa.  E.g., id. at 143 & n.23 (finding “fluidity of funds between VRLC-FIPE 
and VRLC-PC” while overlooking that “funds” flow from VRLC and VRLC-PC (which 
makes contributions) to VRLC-FIPE (which does not), not vice-versa)); Vt. Right to Life 
Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, No.2:09-cv-188, PLS.’ SUMM. J. RESP. BR. at 41–42 & n.48 (D. Vt. Nov. 
18, 2011) (refuting Defendants’ fluidity-of-funds argument and showing that the alleged 
fluidity of funds is not a genuine issue of material fact, because the only alleged fluidity of 
“funds” flows from VRLC and VRLC-PC (which makes contributions) to VRLC-FIPE 
(which does not), not vice-versa); accord VRLC-II, PLS.-APPELLANTS’ VRLC & VRLC-FIPE’S 
REPLY BR. at 39–48 (2d Cir. Dec. 19, 2012) (citing the district-court record and showing that 
Defendants did not prove any contribution VRLC-FIPE receives is used for anything other 
than independent spending for political speech).  So the “fluidity” Defendants allege 
cannot mean any contribution VRLC-FIPE itself receives is used for anything other than 
independent spending.  VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 143. 
79 See VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 143 n.23 (finding that “the record does not show that funds 
from VRLC-FIPE were used for candidate contributions”).  Direct contributions are one 
form of contributions to candidates under the Constitution.  E.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
1, 23 n.24 (1976). 
80 VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 143 n.23; see supra note 76 and accompanying text (highlighting 
the term “used for”); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23 n.24; McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 219–21 
(2003); Colo. Republican-I v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 610–11 (1996); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46–47, 78 
(quoted in FEC v. Survival Educ. Fund, Inc., 65 F.3d 285, 294 (2d Cir. 1995)) (discussing 
particular speech coordinated with candidates).  Contributions can lead to quid pro quo 
corruption or its appearance only when candidates are involved.  McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 
1452. 
81 Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1097; VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 141 (citing Emily’s List 
v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). 
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merely asking for candidates’ positions on issues.82  So asking for and 
publishing candidates’ positions on issues is not coordinated spending.83  
Nor did Defendants show under McCutcheon any “direct exchange of an 
official act for money” or its appearance, or that contributions “are 
directed . . . to a candidate or officeholder.”84  Much less did they show 
any “large”/“massive” contributions to candidates.85 
Fifth, even conceding arguendo that VRLC-FIPE and VRLC-PC are 
one organization, VRLC-II errs in how it assesses under constitutional law 
whether VRLC-FIPE engages in coordinated spending:  VRLC-II asks 
whether organizations are coordinated.86  Instead, the question is whether 
                                                 
82 VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 144; Clifton v. FEC, 114 F.3d 1309, 1311 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 
522 U.S. 1108 (1998) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46–47). 
83 Cf. Colo. Republican-I, 518 U.S. at 613–20 (cited in Clifton, 114 F.3d at 1311).  Otherwise, 
every voter guide would be coordinated spending, and therefore a contribution.  But see 11 
C.F.R. § 109.21.f (establishing post-Clifton that a “candidate’s or a political[-]party 
committee’s response to an inquiry about that candidate’s or political[-]party committee’s 
positions on legislative or policy issues, but not including a discussion of campaign plans, 
projects, activities or needs,” is not coordinated spending). 
84 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441 (citing McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 266 
(1991)).  They showed no “effort to control the exercise of an officeholder’s official 
duties,”—i.e., no “act akin to bribery.”  Id. at 1450, 1452; id. at 1466 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
85 Id. at 1450–53. 
86 See VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 142 (asking “whether a group is functionally distinct from a 
non-independent-expenditure-only” organization (emphasis added)); id. at 144 (finding 
that VRLC-FIPE and VRLC-PC coordinated voter guides and the VRLC’s executive director 
advised a gubernatorial candidate/campaign on issues); id. at 144–45 (focusing on VRLC-
FIPE and “its independence from” VRLC-PC, not the independence of particular speech); 
id. at 145 (focusing on whether “VRLC-FIPE is indistinguishable from VRLC-PC” and not 
the independence of particular speech).  The NCRL-III dissent, which VRLC-II follows, 
makes the same mistake.  See NCRL-III v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 336 (4th Cir. 2008) (Michael, 
J., dissenting).  This VRLC-II holding makes it more than “difficult at times” for low-budget 
organizations to receive unlimited contributions for independent spending.  VRLC-II, 758 
F.3d at 145.  It makes it nearly impossible.  Low-budget organizations such as VRLC, 
VRLC-FIPE, and VRLC-PC cannot afford not to work together.  Their working together is 
not coordination under the Constitution.  See infra note 87 and accompanying text 
(discussing further whether particular speech is coordinated with candidates); cf. Long 
Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684, 698 (9th Cir. 2010), 
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 392 (2010) (holding that persons who “individually” have a First 
Amendment right to engage in particular speech may “collectively enjoy and effectuate 
those expressive freedoms”).  If their working together were coordination, if their joint 
speech were coordinated, and if VRLC-FIPE were constitutionally ineligible to receive 
unlimited contributions for independent spending, then two other similarly-situated, low-
budget plaintiffs would have lost—but they won.  See Wis. Right to Life State PAC v. 
Barland (Barland-I), 664 F.3d 139, 151–55 (7th Cir. 2011); NCRL-III, 525 F.3d at 291–95.  
Firewalls are not affordable for low-budget organizations—not even the FEC requires 
them.  See 11 C.F.R. § 109.21.h.  Besides, under McCutcheon, First Amendment rights are 
important regardless of the size of the speaker.  McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1448 (quoting FEC 
v. NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480, 493 (1985)). 
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particular speech is coordinated with candidates.87  Defendants did not 
show VRLC-FIPE coordinates particular speech with candidates, much 
less that any contribution VRLC-FIPE receives is “used for” coordinating 
particular speech with candidates.88  Considering whether organizations 
are coordinated splits with Republican Party of New Mexico and Clifton.89  
Nor did Defendants show any “approval (or wink or nod)” by any 
candidate/candidate’s committee—i.e., an “arrangement with a 
candidate[,]” or a “request or suggestion” from the 
candidate/candidate’s committee.90 
Sixth, VRLC may and does “wholly control” its own political 
committees.91  Yet if such control meant VRLC-FIPE may not receive 
unlimited contributions for independent spending, then plaintiff-
                                                 
87 See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1454 (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 
(2010), quoting, in turn, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976)) (“The absence of 
prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his 
agent . . . undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate” (emphasis added)); 
FEC v. Colo. Republican-II, 533 U.S. 431, 437–45 (2001) (focusing repeatedly on 
“expenditures” and “spending”).  The fact that organizations coordinate some speech with 
candidates does not prevent them from engaging in other, independent speech.  Colo. 
Republican-II, 533 U.S. at 437–65; McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 215–18 (2003).  Otherwise, 
the government would have won in Colorado Republican-I—but instead the Court held that 
“the constitutionally significant fact” in assessing whether particular speech—not the entire 
political-party organization, but the particular speech—is independent from “the lack of 
coordination” with candidates.  Colo. Republican-I v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 617 (1996).  So 
coordination among organizations—i.e., organizations’ working together—does not 
establish that VRLC-FIPE makes contributions, or that any contribution VRLC-FIPE 
receives is used for anything other than independent spending.  Otherwise, no corporation, 
union, or other organization and its political committee could ever work together without 
coordinated spending, and therefore contributions, occurring. 
88 See supra note 79 and accompanying text (explaining coordination).  Even under 
Vermont law, Defendants did not prove coordination. Compare VRLC-II v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 
118, 143 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 949 (2015), with VT. STAT. 2941.B, VT. ADMIN. 
RULE 2000-1.2, and Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 875 F. Supp. 2d 376, 408 n.25 (D. 
Vt. 2012) (“The record does not evidence any expenditures designated as [VRLC-]FIPE’s 
that were undertaken at the [Brian] Dubie [gubernatorial] campaign’s explicit direction.”). 
89 See Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1096 n.4 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing 
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010)) (stating that “Citizens United did not treat 
corruption as a fact question to be resolved on a case-by-case basis.  Instead, the Court 
considered whether independent speech is the type that poses a risk of quid pro quo corruption 
or the appearance thereof. . . . The Court determined that speech through independent 
expenditures does not pose such a risk.”).  Clifton v. FEC, 114 F.3d 1309, 1311 (1st Cir. 
1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1108 (1998) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46–47) (focusing on 
particular speech). 
90 Vt. Right to Life, 875 F. Supp. 2d at 408 n.25; Colo. Republican-II, 533 U.S. at 442–43; 
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 222 (2003).  Even the FEC requires this.  11 C.F.R. §§ 109.20–
21. 
91 FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 149 (2003). 
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organizations in three other appeals would have lost—but they won.92  
Moreover, by looking to the board-appointment process, board 
membership, committee membership, identical meeting times, and 
VRLC-FIPE’s and VRLC-PC’s discussing “important tactical campaign 
issues” together, VRLC-II splits with Alaska Right to Life Committee v. 
Miles (ARLC).93  Under ARLC, VRLC-FIPE and VRLC-PC are separate 
even if they “share the same director and the same board of directors” 
and the “degree of financial separation among the three entities is 
unclear from the record.”94  VRLC-II also splits with Republican Party of 
New Mexico, under which “overlapping leadership” among VRLC, 
VRLC-PC, and VRLC-FIPE does not help Defendants.95  Like the parallel, 
low-budget plaintiffs in NCRL-III, VRLC, VRLC-FIPE, and VRLC-PC 
“share staff”; sharing leadership/staff is not only legal but also common, 
because it saves money and prevents operating at cross purposes.96 
The second of three circuit splits is in Alabama Democratic Conference 
v. Broussard, which upholds limits on contributions to an organization 
that both makes contributions and engages in independent spending, 
because “both accounts are controlled and can be coordinated by the 
same entity.”97  Without saying so, this presumes the question is whether 
the organization—in any of its activity—can cause quid pro quo 
corruption or its appearance.98  But instead, the question is whether 
particular speech can.99  The fact that organizations may and do “wholly 
control” political committees that they form/have does not mean their 
                                                 
92 VRLC-II v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118, 143 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 949 (2015).  
Wis. Right to Life State PAC v. Barland (Barland-I), 664 F.3d 139, 151–55 (7th Cir. 2011); 
Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684, 696–99 (9th 
Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 392 (2010); NCRL-III v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 291–95 (4th Cir. 
2008). 
93 VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 143–44. 
94 Id. at 143–44; ARLC v. Miles, 441 F.3d 773, 776 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 886 
(2006).  Even the FEC understands the same people can be part of both an organization and 
its political committees.  See ADVISORY OP. 2010-09 at 1–4 (Club for Growth) (FEC July 22, 
2010). 
95 Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1102-03 (10th Cir. 2013). 
96 NCRL-III, 525 F.3d at 294 n.8; see Barland-I, 664 F.3d at 143 (addressing other parallel 
plaintiffs). 
97 Ala. Democratic Conference v. Broussard, 541 F. App’x 931, 935 (11th Cir. 2013) 
(unpublished). 
98 While discussing organizations that make contributions and engage in independent 
spending, Stop this Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund v. FEC expressly inquires whether 
the organizations cause quid pro quo corruption or its appearance.  902 F. Supp. 2d 23, 38, 40–
44 (D.D.C. 2012) (addressing entities, a PAC, a hybrid PAC, and a single entity). 
99 See supra notes 79, 83 and accompanying text (asking whether particular speech by an 
organization, not the organization itself, can cause quid pro quo corruption or its 
appearance).  Republican Party of New Mexico, 741 F.3d at 1096 n.4, 1102 n.11, expressly 
disagrees with Alabama Democratic Conference, 541 F. App’x at 931. 
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independent spending can cause quid pro quo corruption or its 
appearance.100  Merely finding that organizations contribute to each 
other, have common members, or receive contributions from candidates 
cannot establish that contributions the organizations make cause quid pro 
quo corruption or its appearance absent evidence that the contributions 
go to candidates.101 
The third of three circuit splits is Stop this Insanity, Inc. Employee 
Leadership Fund v. FEC.102  Stop this Insanity misses the point when it tells 
the plaintiff-political committee, which wants to receive unlimited 
contributions for an independent-spending fund/account, that the 
political committee’s connected organization may instead receive 
unlimited contributions for independent spending.103  The plaintiff-
political committee is “a separate association” and “a separate legal 
entity” and has its own rights.104  If Stop this Insanity were correct, 
connected political committees in three other appeals would have lost—
but they won.105  Stop this Insanity also relies on the need for “disclosure” 
to support limiting contributions for independent spending.106  
However, disclosure and limits are separate concepts.107 
                                                 
100 FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 149 (2003); supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
101 Ala. Democratic Conference, 541 F. App’x at 936; McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 
1452 (2014). 
102 Stop this Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund v. FEC, 761 F.3d 10, 17 (D.C. Cir. 
2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 949 (2015).  The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Stop this 
Insanity on the same day that—and on the same page where—it denied certiorari in VRLC-II 
v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 949 (2015). 
103 See generally 52 U.S.C. § 30101.7 (2012) (defining connected organization); Emily’s List 
v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1, 8 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (presenting a facial challenge).  Stop this Insanity, 
761 F.3d at 14; see Stop this Insanity, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 32, 44 (saying the same both about 
the connected organization and about another political committee). 
104 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 337 (2010); Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 
196 (1981). 
105 Wis. Right to Life State PAC v. Barland (Barland-I), 664 F.3d 139, 155 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(addressing WRTL-SPAC, a political committee connected to WRTL); Long Beach Area 
Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684, 699 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 392 (2010) (addressing political committees connected to the chamber); NCRL-III 
v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 295 (4th Cir. 2008) (addressing NCRL-FIPE, a political committee 
connected to NCRL). 
106 Stop this Insanity, 761 F.3d at 16–17. 
107 See Yamada v. Kuramoto, 744 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1082 n.9 (D. Haw. 2010), appeal 
dismissed, No.10-17280 (9th Cir. June 10, 2011) (recognizing that disclosure and limits are 
separate concepts). 
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G. Aberrant District Court Orders 
The Stop this Insanity district court order believes Emily’s List does 
not address contributions for independent spending.108  But Emily’s List 
does.109  Stop this Insanity also believes case law on contributions received 
for independent spending does not apply to such contributions received 
by connected political committees.110  But it does.111  The order further 
believes case law does not apply to connected political committees 
making contributions and independent expenditures properly understood 
from separate accounts.112  But it does.113  And, notwithstanding Stop this 
Insanity, whether independent spending is an independent expenditure 
does not matter here.114   
Meanwhile, Catholic Leadership Coalition of Texas v. Reisman upholds a 
limit on contributions for independent spending—it presumes that a 
contribution/contact list which an organization receives only for 
independent spending must also be for contributions that the organization 
makes, which is not true.115 
H. Possible Counterarguments 
Any holding regarding the facial constitutionality of contribution 
limits in general is of no moment to challenges to limits on contributions 
for independent spending, because the latter challenges are as-applied 
                                                 
108 See Stop this Insanity, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 41 (holding incorrectly that Emily’s List v. 
FEC, 581 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009), does not control). 
109 Emily’s List, 581 F.3d at 4–5, 15–18. 
110 Stop this Insanity, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 29, 31–32, 42 n.23 (saying incorrectly and without 
explanation that “disclosure requirements” would be “meaningless”). 
111 See supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing connected political committees). 
112 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 & n.52, 80 (1976) (defining express advocacy and 
thereby independent expenditure); Stop this Insanity, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 41.  The plaintiff-
political committee seeks to make contributions and engage in independent spending from 
separate funds/accounts, so it is a “hybrid” political committee.  Emily’s List, 581 F.3d at 12; 
contra Stop this Insanity, 761 F.3d at 15 (“not a ‘hybrid’”). 
113 See Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1097 (10th Cir. 2013); Emily’s List, 
581 F.3d at 12. 
114 Stop this Insanity, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 40–42 & n.19 (“express advocacy”); see supra note 
8–9 and accompanying text (explaining that a person who has a First Amendment right to 
engage in independent expenditures has a First Amendment right to engage in any 
independent spending for political speech). 
115 Catholic Leadership Coal. of Tex. v. Reisman, No.A-12-CA-566-SS, 2013 WL 2404066, 
at *15–16 & n.3 (W.D. Tex. May 30, 2013).  The Fifth Circuit affirmed on this claim, and 
otherwise affirmed in part and reversed on other grounds.  Catholic Leadership Coal. of 
Tex. v. Reisman, 764 F.3d 409, 442–45 (5th Cir. 2014). 
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challenges.116  Only in the California Medical Association concurrence, 
which is the controlling opinion, does the Supreme Court address the 
constitutionality of limiting contributions for independent spending.117  
Other Supreme Court opinions do not. 
The California Medical Association plurality addresses a political 
committee that by definition makes contributions to candidates.118  The 
fact that the political committee may also engage in independent 
spending does not change the fact that the plurality does not address 
independent spending.119  Only the concurrence does.120  When the 
plurality refers to a political committee’s “independent political 
advocacy[,]” that means the California Medical Association PAC’s 
political advocacy is independent of the California Medical Association 
in the sense that the political committee “is a separate legal entity” from 
the California Medical Association as a matter of law.121 
FEC v. National Conservative PAC’s statement about limiting 
contributions for independent spending is dictum, because no 
contribution limit was at issue.122  Even if this dictum supported limiting 
contributions for independent spending when the Court decided 
NCPAC, subsequent opinions control for the reasons discussed next in 
addressing Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC 
(Colorado Republican-I).123 
                                                 
116 E.g., Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1095–97 (ruling on an as-applied challenge); 
Wis. Right to Life State PAC v. Barland (Barland-I), 664 F.3d 139, 151–55 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(ruling on an as-applied challenge). 
117 Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 203 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring); see supra 
notes 39–40 and accompanying text (discussing the concurring opinion, which is the 
controlling opinion and states that government may never limit contributions to 
organizations engaging in only independent spending). 
118 Cal. Med. Ass’n, 453 U.S. at 185 n.1, 197 n.17; id. at 203 (Blackmun, J., concurring); 
Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1093, 1098–99. 
119 E.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 152 n.48 (2003) (stating that the California Medical 
Association statute “restricted . . . the source and amount of funds available to engage in 
noncoordinated expenditures”). 
120 Cal. Med. Ass’n, 453 U.S. at 203 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Republican Party of N.M., 741 
F.3d at 1098–99.  Stop this Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund v. FEC incorrectly believes 
the California Medical Association plurality and the Buckley v. Valeo Court address 
contributions for independent spending.  See Stop this Insanity, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 33, 43 
(misinterpreting California Medical Association and Buckley). 
121 Cal. Med. Ass’n, 453 U.S. at 196; see Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 337 (2010) (“a 
separate association”). 
122 FEC v. NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480, 484, 495 (1985) (“the present cases involve [limits] on 
expenditures by PACs, not on the contributions they receive; and in any event these 
contributions are predominantly small and thus do not raise the same concerns as the 
sizable contributions involved in California Medical Ass[ociatio]n”). 
123 NCPAC and Colorado Republican-I did not support limiting contributions for 
independent spending, and courts did not need Citizens United to hold that government 
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The Colorado Republican-I plurality’s statement regarding 
contributions that political parties receive for independent spending 
incorrectly presumes independent spending can cause corruption, and 
does not contemplate receiving contributions for a separate independent-
spending account.124  Anyway, the statement is dictum, because no 
contribution limit was at issue.125  Even if this dictum supported limiting 
contributions for independent spending when the Court decided 
Colorado Republican-I, subsequent opinions—including Citizens United, 
AFEC, and McCutcheon—control in a way that extends beyond limits on 
independent spending for political speech to limits on contributions for 
independent spending for political speech.126  Regardless of whether pre-
Citizens United opinions helped the cause of limiting contributions for 
independent spending before Citizens United, they do not do so after 
                                                                                                             
may not limit contributions for independent spending.  See Emily’s List v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1, 
9–12 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (rejecting a limit on contributions for independent spending post-
NCPAC, post-Colorado Republican-I, and pre-Citizens United); NCRL-III v. Leake, 525 F.3d 
274, 291 (4th Cir. 2008) (rejecting a limit on contributions for independent spending post-
NCPAC, post-Colorado Republican-I, and pre-Citizens United). 
124 See Colo. Republican-I v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 617 (1996).  Colorado Republican-I states: 
The greatest danger of corruption, therefore, appears to be from the 
ability of donors to give sums up to $20,000 to a party which may be 
used for independent party expenditures for the benefit of a particular 
candidate.  We could understand how Congress, were it to conclude 
that the potential for evasion of the individual contribution limits was 
a serious matter, might decide to change the statute’s limit[]s on 
contributions to political parties. 
Id.  And Colorado Republican-I cites the California Medical Association v. FEC plurality, 453 
U.S. at 197–99, which does not address contributions for independent spending.  See supra 
notes 117–121 and accompanying text (discussing the California Medical Association 
plurality’s opinion). 
125 See Colorado Republican-I, 518 U.S. at 608–13 (discussing independent expenditures). 
126 Again, the Colorado Republican-I dictum did not support limiting contributions for 
independent spending.  See supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing post-Colorado 
Republican-I opinions holding that government may not limit contributions for independent 
spending); see also Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 
at 694–95 n.5, cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 392 (2010) (holding post-Citizens United that government 
may not limit contributions for independent spending); SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 
686, 694 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 553 (2010) (holding post-Citizens 
United that government may not limit contributions for independent spending).  
Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1094–95, 1098–99 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding 
post-Citizens United that government may not limit contributions for independent 
spending); Wis. Right to Life State PAC v. Barland (Barland-I), 664 F.3d 139, 153–54 (7th Cir. 
2011) (holding post-Citizens United that government may not limit contributions for 
independent spending); Yamada v. Kuramoto, 744 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1083–84 (D. Haw. 
2010), appeal dismissed, No.10-17280 (9th Cir. June 10, 2011) (holding post-Citizens United that 
government may not limit contributions for independent spending). 
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Citizens United.127  The only government interest in banning, or otherwise 
limiting, political speech—whether contributions or spending—is the 
prevention of quid pro quo corruption or its appearance.  Independent 
spending does not cause quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, 
especially after McCutcheon narrows quid pro quo corruption and its 
appearance.  Contributions for independent spending, even ones that are 
large/massive, are not directed to candidates, so they cannot cause quid 
pro quo corruption or its appearance.128 
Even circuit opinions issued between Citizens United and McCutcheon 
apply the Citizens United quid pro quo-corruption-or-its-appearance 
framework to contributions for independent spending, not just 
independent spending itself.129 
The reasons McConnell v. FEC does not support limiting 
contributions for independent spending are simpler and more basic than 
some circuits’ analyses.130 
While McConnell addresses, for example, 2 U.S.C. § 441i (now 52 
U.S.C. § 30125), part of the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”), 
McConnell is entirely a facial challenge.131  Law can be facially 
                                                 
127 E.g., Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1096, 1098–1102 (discussing how Citizens 
United impacts the analysis). 
128 See supra notes 16–21 and accompanying text (defining quid pro quo corruption). 
129 E.g., Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1094–95 (applying the quid pro quo-
corruption-or-its-appearance framework to contributions for independent spending); 
Barland-I, 664 F.3d at 153–54 (applying the quid pro quo-corruption-or-its-appearance 
framework to contributions for independent spending); Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 
F.3d 1109, 1118 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying the quid pro quo-corruption-or-its-appearance 
framework to contributions for independent spending); Long Beach, 603 F.3d at 696–99; 
SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 694–96 (applying the quid pro quo-corruption-or-its-appearance 
framework to contributions for independent spending). 
130 The analysis is not complicated.  See supra note 20 (quoting Republican Party of N.M., 
741 F.3d at 1091, 1092, 1093 n.2) (holding that government may not limit contributions that 
are “used for” independent spending, even when the contributee also makes 
contributions).  Nevertheless, three circuits have indulged complicated dicta.  See Republican 
Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1099–1100 (addressing political parties, the discussion of which is 
dictum, because no political party sought to receive unlimited contributions for 
independent spending); Thalheimer, 645 F.3d at 1121 (quoting Long Beach, 603 F.3d at 696) 
(stating that “the contribution limits in McConnell and [Cal. Med. Ass’n] were justified by an 
anti-corruption interest because the regulated entities had unusually close relationships 
with the candidates they supported”—all of which was dictum, because no “unusually 
close relationships” were at issue in Thalheimer or Long Beach); Emily’s List v. FEC, 581 F.3d 
1, 13–14 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (addressing political parties, the discussion of which is dictum, 
because no political party sought to receive unlimited contributions for independent 
spending). 
131 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 154–85 (2003).  See also Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. 
Barland (Barland-II), 751 F.3d 804, 836–37 (7th Cir. 2014) (recognizing that McConnell’s 
decision to uphold the law facially does not mean it is always constitutional as applied).  
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constitutional and still be unconstitutional as applied to particular 
speech.132 
Moreover, this part of FECA reaches donations for speech other than 
independent spending.  That is, this part of FECA reaches not just 
donations to organizations that engage in only independent spending, or 
organizations that both make contributions and engage in independent 
spending from separate accounts.  This part of FECA also reaches 
donations to other organizations.133  In addressing what was solely a 
facial challenge, McConnell had no need to parse facts for subsequent as-
applied challenges.134  Thus, the issues in McConnell are distinguishable.  
Because McConnell is not about only independent spending, it is 
incorrect to believe McConnell applies. 
Caperton v. Massey does not support limiting contributions for 
independent spending.  Rather, Caperton addresses whether an elected 
state-court justice should have recused himself when an officer of a 
corporation before the Court had engaged in independent expenditures, 
and had contributed to a committee that engaged in independent 
                                                                                                             
E.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 134 (“a facial First Amendment challenge”); id. at 174 (“on its 
face”); id. at 181 (“plaintiffs’ facial challenge”). 
132 Compare McConnell, 540 U.S. at 190–94 (upholding the FECA electioneering-
communication ban facially), with Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC (WRTL-I), 546 U.S. 410, 
411–12 (2006) (holding that McConnell’s facial holding does not preclude as-applied 
challenges). 
133 See 52 U.S.C. §§ 30125(a)–(b), (d)–(f) (2012) (reaching donations to other 
organizations).  For example, Sections 30125(a) and (b) address federal political-party 
committees, and state and local political-party committees, respectively.  Id. § 30125(a)–(b).  
While parties engage in independent spending for political speech, they do far more than 
that.  See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 154–85 (discussing party activities); Colo. Republican-I 
v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 608–13 (1996) (discussing spending limits).  One example is 
coordinated spending for political speech, which counts as an indirect contribution.  See 
FEC v. Colo. Republican-II, 533 U.S. 431, 437–40 (2001); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46–47, 
78 (1976). 
 Section 30125(d) bans some donations to Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c) and 
527 organizations.  52 U.S.C. § 30125(d).  Except as the law forbids, Section 501(c) and 527 
organizations may contribute directly and indirectly to candidates and political parties.  
E.g., 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a) (2012) (banning corporate and union contributions to federal 
political committees). 
 Section 30125(e) addresses how federal candidates, federal officeholders, their agents, 
and organizations they establish, finance, maintain or control, and raise money.  52 U.S.C. 
§ 30125(e).  In particular, 52 U.S.C. § 30125(e)(4)(B) refers to money they raise for activity in 
52 U.S.C. § 30101(20)(A)(i) and 30101(20)(A)(ii).  Such solicitations can be for speech other 
than independent spending for political speech.  52 U.S.C. § 30125(e).   
Section 30125(f) addresses particular speech by state and local candidates.  Id. 
§ 30125(f). 
134 See, e.g., WRTL-I, 546 U.S. at 411–12 (holding that “[i]n upholding § 203 against a facial 
challenge, we did not purport to resolve future as-applied challenges”). 
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expenditures, for the then-candidate for justice.135  The judicial-recusal 
standard does not inquire after corruption or its appearance as in Citizens 
United.136  Instead, the threshold is lower.137  As Justice Anthony 
Kennedy, Caperton’s author, explains in Citizens United, Caperton is 
different from Citizens United.138   
Nor do appellate opinions such a Cao v. FEC support limiting 
contributions for independent spending—Cao is about “in-kind and 
direct contributions” by parties to candidates, not contributions for 
independent spending.139 
I. Conclusion on Contributions for Independent Spending 
Advocates of limiting contributions for independent spending can 
assign any label they please—such as “crabbed view of corruption”—to 
post-Citizens United law, but that does not change the law.140  These labels 
are not legal argument, nor are they helpful.141  Contributions for 
independent spending for political speech do not cause quid pro quo 
corruption or its appearance, so government may not limit such 
contributions from persons other than foreign nationals. 
                                                 
135 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 872–73 (2009). 
136 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 356–61 (2010). 
137 See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 881 (noting that “[t]he Court asks not whether the judge is 
actually, subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in his position is ‘likely’ to be 
neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional ‘potential for bias’”). 
138 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360.  Citizens United states: 
Caperton held that a judge was required to recuse himself “when a 
person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and 
disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising 
funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was 
pending or imminent.”  The remedy of recusal was based on a 
litigant’s due[-]process right to a fair trial before an unbiased judge.  
Caperton’s holding was limited to the rule that the judge must be 
recused, not that the litigant’s political speech could be banned. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
139 In re Cao, 619 F.3d 410, 421 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1718 (2011). 
140 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 152 (2003) (quoted in Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 447 
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).  Cf. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 447 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(lamenting Citizens United while quoting the same text from McConnell); Emily’s List v. 
FEC, 581 F.3d 1, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Brown, J., concurring) (lamenting McConnell pre-
Citizens United). 
141 See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & 
Fight for Equality by any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1639 (2014) (Roberts, 
C.J., concurring) (stating that “[p]eople can disagree in good faith on this issue, but it 
similarly does more harm than good to question the openness and candor of those on 
either side of the debate”). 
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III.  LIMITS ON DIRECT CONTRIBUTIONS TO CANDIDATES 
A. McCutcheon’s Impact on Contribution Limit Review 
On April 2, 2014, in a five-to-four decision, the United States 
Supreme Court struck down federal aggregate contribution limits to 
candidates or committees.142  These limits supplemented base 
contribution limits on how much could be given to each candidate or 
committee.143  So although plaintiff Shaun McCutcheon desired to 
contribute the maximum legal amount to numerous federal candidates 
and non-candidate political committees, he was restricted by 
overarching aggregate limits.144  A plurality of the Court found that 
those aggregate limits served neither a corruption nor an anti-
circumvention interest.145  And even if the anti-circumvention interest 
were served, the Court found that the limits were mismatched to that 
interest, particularly because more reasonable alternatives exist.146 
While directed towards aggregate contribution limits, the 
McCutcheon decision redefines and clarifies the legal principles 
governing contribution limit challenges in several key ways.  First, the 
decision makes clear that contributions are not simply an associational 
right but political expression in their own right:  
[T]he First Amendment safeguards an individual’s right 
to participate in the public debate through political 
expression and political association. . . .  When an 
individual contributes money to a candidate, he 
exercises both of those rights:  [t]he contribution “serves 
as a general expression of support for the candidate and 
his views” and “serves to affiliate a person with a 
candidate.”147 
Second, the decision expressly identified which state interests are 
cognizable and which are not.  The government cannot adopt 
                                                 
142 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1440, 1462, 1465 (2014). 
143 Id. at 1442. 
144 Id. at 1443. 
145 Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, reasoning that Buckley v. Valeo’s distinction 
between independent expenditures and contributions were “two sides of the same First 
Amendment coin,” and so Buckley’s less rigorous scrutiny for contribution limits—which 
the plurality used in reaching its result—ought to be overturned.  Id. at 1464 (quoting 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 241 (1976), Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); Id. at 1454–56. 
146 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1456–59. 
147 Id. at 1448 (citations omitted). 
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contribution limits as a means of “reduc[ing] the amount of money in 
politics,” of “restrict[ing] the political participation of some in order to 
enhance the relative influence of others,” or of preventing “general 
gratitude a candidate may feel toward those who support him or his 
allies, or the political access such support may afford.”148  It cannot 
attempt to “level the playing field,” “level electoral opportunities,” or 
“equaliz[e] the financial resources of candidates.”149  Nor may the 
government “seek to limit the appearance of mere influence or access.”150  
Not only are efforts to “‘restrict the speech of some elements of our 
society to enhance the relative voices of others . . . wholly foreign to the 
First Amendment[,]’” these objectives “impermissibly inject the 
Government ‘into the debate over who should govern’ . . . the last people 
[who should] help decide who should govern.”151  Such limits only 
penalize “an individual for ‘robustly exercising’ his First Amendment 
rights.”152 
The only cognizable justification for contribution limits is preventing 
quid pro quo corruption, with quid pro quo corruption now meaning only 
“a direct exchange of an official act for money,” or “dollars for political 
favors,” “an act akin to bribery.”153  The government “may permissibly 
seek to rein in ‘large contributions [that] are given to secure a political 
quid pro quo from current and potential office holders.’”154  And it may 
“limit ‘the appearance of corruption’”—that is, “‘public awareness of the 
opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial 
contributions’ to particular candidates.”155  The plurality cautioned, 
however, that “[s]pending large sums of money in connection with 
elections, but not in connection with an effort to control the exercise of an 
officeholder’s official duties, does not give rise to such quid pro quo 
corruption.”156  Nor do large sums spent to garner influence or access to 
elected officials or political parties.157  “[T]he risk of corruption arises 
when an individual makes large contributions to the candidate or 
officeholder himself.”158 
                                                 
148 Id. at 1441. 
149 Id. at 1450. 
150 Id. at 1451 (emphasis added) (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010)). 
151 Id. at 1450 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976)); McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 
at 1441–42 (citing Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 
2806, 2826 (2011)). 
152 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1449. 
153 Id. at 1441; id. at 1466 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
154 Id. at 1450 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26). 
155 Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27). 
156 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450.  
157 Id. at 1451. 
158 Id. at 1460. 
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The government may also justify contribution limits “by 
demonstrating that they prevent circumvention” of laws designed to 
prevent quid pro quo corruption.159  Contribution limits targeting quid pro 
quo corruption through circumvention must still, however, guard 
“against an individual’s funneling [of] ‘massive amounts of money to a 
particular candidate.’”160 
Third, the decision allocates the burden of proof in reviewing 
contribution limits:  “[w]hen the Government restricts speech, the 
Government bears the burden of proving the constitutionality of its 
actions.”161  This burden applies both to proof of a cognizable interest, as 
well to prove the limits are closely drawn.162  And whether it offers proof 
of quid pro quo corruption, proof of circumvention, or proof the limits are 
closely drawn, the government’s evidence cannot be speculative, “mere 
conjecture,” “highly implausible,” irrational, premised on illegal 
conduct, largely inapplicable, or “divorced from reality.”163 
Fourth, the decision discards the argument that contributions from 
organizations corrupt more than those from individuals:  “there is not 
the same risk of quid pro quo corruption or its appearance when money 
flows through independent actors to a candidate, as when a donor 
contributes to a candidate directly.”164  An individual cedes control over 
his contribution when he gives to an independent actor, and “if the 
funds are subsequently rerouted to a particular candidate, such actions 
occur[] at the initial recipient’s discretion—not the donor’s.”165  This 
creates an ever-growing chain of attribution, with credit “shared among 
the various actors along the way.”166  Such contributions are thus diluted 
by all the other contributions from others to the same independent 
actors.167 
Last, the decision shows the analysis required under the “closely 
drawn test” to assess whether contribution limits were adequately 
                                                 
159 Id. at 1439. 
160 Id. at 1460 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 38); see supra text accompanying note 32 
(discussing anti-circumvention as a state interest). 
161 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452 (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 
U.S. 803, 816 (2000)). 
162 See id. at 1452–53 (reasoning that Congress’s selection of a $5200 base limit suggests 
that a contribution of that amount or less would not create a cognizable risk of corruption). 
163 Id. at 1452–56 (explaining that in the Buckley decision, the fear of an individual 
contributing substantial amounts of money to one candidate was far too speculative). 
164 Id. at 1452. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452 (explaining that any credit has to be shared with all 
of the various actors along the line, which consequently makes the chain of attribution 
much longer). 
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tailored.168  The Court evaluated whether “a substantial mismatch 
[existed] between the Government’s stated objective and the means 
selected to achieve it,” whether there was a “reasonable fit” to serve that 
objective.169  This reasonable fit, while “not necessarily the least 
restrictive means,” must still be “a means narrowly tailored to achieve 
the desired objective.”170  The availability of better, more reasonable 
alternatives belie a “closely drawn” claim.171  The closely drawn test is 
applied especially rigorously where a limit is part of “prophylaxis-upon-
prophylaxis” regulation, that is, layers of regulation ostensibly designed 
to address the same anti-corruption interest.172 
B. McCutcheon’s Effect on Candidate Contribution Limits Analysis 
Because of McCutcheon, key circuit court decisions that previously 
upheld limits on direct contributions to candidates are no longer legally 
sound.  In the Ninth Circuit’s Montana Right to Life v. Eddleman, issued in 
2003, the court upheld both base contribution limits on individuals and 
PACs as well as aggregate limits on PACs.173  Its rationale for doing so 
conflicts with McCutcheon. 
Significantly, the Eddleman decision focuses on the state’s interest in 
“preventing undue influence.”174  Relying on Nixon v. Shrink Missouri 
Gov’t PAC, Eddleman contends that a state’s interest in preventing 
corruption or the appearance of corruption is not confined to instances of 
bribery of public officials, but extends “to the broader threat from 
politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors.”175  The 
court in Eddleman considered as evidence of this threat the testimony of a 
Montana legislator that “special interests funnel more money into 
campaigns when particular issues approach a vote ‘because it gets 
results’,” citing a letter from a state senator to his colleagues urging a 
                                                 
168 Id. at 1446. 
169 See id. at 1456 (stating that the Court requires a fit that is reasonable when not 
applying strict scrutiny). 
170 Id. at 1456–57 (quoting Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 
(1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
171 See id. at 1458 (discussing the many alternatives Congress can use to adhere to the 
government’s anticircumvention interest) (citation omitted). 
172 See id. (analyzing the closely drawn test). 
173 Montana Right to Life v. Eddleman, 343 F.3d 1085, 1098 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming the 
district court’s holding that Montana’s base and aggregate contribution limits are 
constitutional and do not violate the First Amendment). 
174 Id. at 1096, 1099 (Teilborg, J., dissenting) (“the State has chosen to enact an aggregate 
PAC contribution limit to prevent a candidate from being overly influenced by special 
interests generally”). 
175 Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000); Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 
1092 (quoting Shrink Missouri PAC, 528 U.S. at 389) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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favorable vote on a bill because it would ensure that a higher proportion 
of PAC money would flow to the Republican party, and citing a poll 
showing that “69% of Montanans [suspect] that elected officials give 
special treatment to individuals and businesses that make large 
contributions”—evidence that shows not bribery but influence and 
access.176 
Under McCutcheon, these concerns do not rise to the level of a 
cognizable state interest.177  Corruption is a cognizable interest only 
when defined as quid pro quo corruption, that is, “a direct exchange of an 
official act for money,” “dollars for political favors,” or “akin to 
bribery.”178  So the Eddleman’s state interest analysis—and the Shrink’s 
analysis on which it relies—are no longer valid.179 
Additionally, as to PAC contribution limits both base and aggregate, 
the Eddleman court held that undue influence is bolstered by the fact that 
the “danger of corruption in the political system is greater with respect 
to PAC contributions than it is for individuals.”180  McCutcheon rejects 
this contention, observing that “there is not the same risk of quid pro quo 
corruption or its appearance when money flows through independent 
actors to a candidate, as when a donor contributes to a candidate 
directly.”181  Because PACs, like political parties, are independent from 
individual donors, there is less danger of corruption from individuals 
through PAC contributions. 
After establishing an “undue influence” interest, the Eddleman court 
determined that the focus of base contribution limits’ tailoring analysis is 
“as much on those aspects of associational freedom unaffected by the 
law as the limitations that are imposed,” justifying this approach with 
the Shrink presumption that “the dollar amounts employed to prevent 
corruption should be upheld unless they are ‘so radical in effect as to 
                                                 
176 Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1093 (describing an incident in 1981 where a Republican state 
senator sent a letter persuading his colleagues to vote to pass a bill allowing variable 
annual annuities to secure a substantial portion of PAC contributions for the Republican 
party). 
177 See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1451 (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360 
(2010)) (explaining that “the appearance of corruption is equally confined to the 
appearance of quid pro quo corruption” and that “the Government may not seek to limit the 
appearance of mere influence or access”). 
178 Id. at 1441; id. at 1466 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
179 Indeed, concerns about a politician being “too compliant” to large contributors speaks 
to undue influence concerns, not quid pro quo corruption concerns.  Id. at 1469 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting); see also Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1099 (Teilborg, J., dissenting) (“having a limit on 
the amount an individual PAC may contribute to a candidate sufficiently 
prevents . . . ‘unfair influence’ over a candidate”). 
180 Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1097 (citation omitted). 
181 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452. 
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render political association ineffective, drive the sound of a candidate’s 
voice beyond the level of notice, and render contributions pointless.’”182  
So the Eddleman analysis offset burdens on association with 
opportunities that remained unaffected, finding that the PAC aggregate 
limits before it “in no way prevents PACs from affiliating with their 
chosen candidates in ways other than direct contributions. . . .”183 
This analysis fails under McCutcheon for two reasons.  First, it 
focuses tailoring solely on the associational aspect that the contribution 
limits affect.184  But as McCutcheon states, when an individual contributes 
money to a candidate, he exercises both an expressive as well as an 
associational right.185  And second, while theoretically, supporters can 
associate and express themselves in numerous ways other than 
contributing, as a practical matter, many supporters, whether 
individuals or groups, do not have available to them a panoply of 
alternative, effective means to support all of their preferred candidates or 
causes.186  Eddleman considered no evidence that such alternatives were 
plausible and practical. 
Indeed, Eddleman fails to even consider, much less assess, less 
restrictive alternatives for fulfilling the state’s interests in averting actual 
or apparent corruption, such as disclosure.187  As McCutcheon 
unequivocally establishes, the government must show that the 
contribution limits are the more reasonable fit.188  Eddleman considered 
no such evidence. 
Finally, Eddleman’s tailoring analysis nowhere considers the 
prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis aspect of Montana’s contribution limit 
scheme.189  McCutcheon expresses concern about layering aggregate 
contribution limits on top of base limits and mandates use of a 
particularly rigorous closely drawn test in such a context:  a 
“‘prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis approach’ requires . . . particular[] 
                                                 
182 Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1094 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 
397 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1448 (explaining that a donor has expressive and 
associational rights that are denied by the base limits). 
186 See id. at 1449 (describing how the numerous other ways of contributing to a political 
party is unrealistic). 
187 See id. at 1460 (“disclosure often represents a less restrictive alternative . . . [and] offers 
much more robust protections against corruption”). 
188 See id. at 1456 (“[e]ven when the Court is not applying strict scrutiny, we still require a 
fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single 
best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served . . . ” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
189 Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1094. 
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diligen[ce] in scrutinizing the law’s fit.”190  But Eddleman does not 
analyze the fit of the PAC aggregate limits before it as McCutcheon 
requires.191  McCutcheon calls Eddleman into serious doubt. 
The same can be said of the 2011 Second Circuit decision Ognibene v. 
Parkes.192  It too considered contribution limits:  one that is a direct, 
“doing business” limit, and two that are bans—a matching fund ban and 
a business entity ban.  New York City’s regulations: 
[R]estrict[] contributions from [] individuals and entities 
who have business dealings with the City . . . [and] 
lower[] these donors’ contribution limits approximately 
twelve-fold, to $400 (from the generally-applicable level 
of $[4950]) for three City-wide offices; to $320 (from 
$[3850]) for Borough offices; and to $250 (from $[2750]) 
for City Council.  The law also makes these 
contributions ineligible for public matching, and extends 
the ban on corporate contributions to LLCs, LLPs, and 
partnerships.193 
As in Eddleman, the rationale and outcome of Ognibene would be much 
different under McCutcheon. 
First, as in Eddleman, the state interest is invalid.  The Second Circuit 
held that while “mere influence or access to elected officials is 
insufficient . . . improper or undue influence presumably still qualifies as a 
form of corruption.”194  Such “[i]mproper or undue influences includes 
both traditional quid pro quo and more discreet exchanges of money for 
favorable outcomes.”195  Additionally, the Second Circuit reasoned that: 
[B]ecause the scope of quid pro quo corruption can never 
be reliably ascertained, the legislature may regulate 
certain indicators of such corruption or its appearance, 
such as when donors make large contributions because 
they have business with the City, hope to do business 
                                                 
190 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1458. 
191 See id. (stating that the Court “cannot conclude that the sweeping aggregate limits are 
appropriately tailored to guard against any contributions that might implicate the 
[g]overnment’s anticircumvention interest”). 
192 Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 185, 193–94 (2d Cir. 2012). 
193 Id. at 179–80 (citing N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3–703(1)(l); 3–703(1-a); 3–719(2)(b)). 
194 Id. at 186. 
195 Id. at 187. 
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with the City, or are expending money on behalf of 
others who do business with the City.196 
Whether the initial limits have been successful and make the lower 
limits unnecessary, said the Second Circuit, “is a matter of policy better 
suited for the legislature.”197  So it held that all three limits—the doing 
business contribution limits, the matching fund ban, and the business 
entity ban—served this interest.198 
Under McCutcheon, averting or curbing influence—undue or 
otherwise—is not a recognized interest.199  Nor is “regulat[ing] certain 
indicators of [] corruption or its appearance” because “the scope of quid 
pro quo corruption can never be reliably ascertained.”200  Moreover, 
McCutcheon states that though ‘[t]he line between quid pro quo corruption 
and general influence may seem vague at times, . . . the distinction must 
be respected to safeguard basic First Amendment rights,” with the line 
“err[ing] on the side of protecting political speech rather than 
suppressing it.”201  Not only did the Second Circuit accept what 
McCutcheon has since invalidated as a state interest, it extended the 
government too much deference, erring on the side of unproved 
corruption than on that of protected speech.202 
                                                 
196 Id. 
197 Id. at 189. 
198 The evidence on which the court relied suggests that the real objective of the “doing 
business” contribution limits and the matching fund ban was to level the playing field by 
offsetting perceived access with lower contribution receipts.  In a report on which the 
district court relied, the City Council states: 
While there is nothing intrinsically wrong with contributions from 
those doing business with the City, the ability of such individuals to 
contribute could create a perception, regardless of whether such 
perception is accurate, that such individuals have a higher level of 
access to the City's elected officials.  It is important to eradicate this 
perception and reduce the appearance of undue influence associated 
with contributions from individuals doing business with the City. 
Ognibene v. Parkes, 599 F. Supp. 2d 434, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).  But see McCutcheon v. FEC, 
134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450–51 (2014) (stating that such interests are improper). 
199 See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450–51 (stating that averting or curbing influence is not 
a recognized interest). 
200 Ognibene, 671 F.3d at 187. 
201 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1451 (quoting FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 
457 (2007)). 
202 See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1451–52 (“The line between quid pro quo corruption and 
general influence may seem vague at times, but the distinction must be respected in order 
to safeguard basic First Amendment rights”); see also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 
361 (2010) (“When Congress finds that a problem exists, we must give that finding due 
deference; but Congress may not choose an unconstitutional remedy . . .”). 
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The Second Circuit’s tailoring analysis is also inadequate under 
McCutcheon.  All three contribution regulations are what McCutcheon 
refers to as “prophylaxis-on-prophylaxis” regulations.203  Base limits 
already exist establishing a contribution baseline at which the City has 
presumably determined that its officials are not corrupted.  So to justify 
the lower limits and bans for business-dealing donors and business 
entities, their “fit” is subject to especially rigorous review, something the 
Second Circuit failed to do.204 
Under such review, the “doing business” limits would fail because 
the City’s evidence nowhere demonstrated that while a $4951 
contribution in a city-wide campaign can bribe or appear to bribe a 
candidate, anything larger than $400 from a business-dealing donor 
results in bribery or would appear to be a bribe.  The matching fund ban 
would fail because the City nowhere demonstrated that matching funds 
triggered by a contribution from someone doing business with the City 
will corrupt a candidate any more than funds triggered at the same rate 
by any other contributor.  And the business-entity ban would fail 
because the City offered no evidence demonstrating that even $1 of 
corporate contributions would corrupt while contributions as high as 
$4950 from the corporate owners’ spouses, domestic partners, 
employees, and children would not.  This is the type of evidence 
required under McCutcheon.  Lacking such evidence, the limits fail. 
Additionally, the Second Circuit acknowledged that more narrow 
regulations—bribery laws, earmarking bans, and disclosure—are more 
narrow options.205  While the government does not need to choose the 
least restrictive means of regulating contribution limits, it must show 
that other alternatives are a less reasonable fit so as to avoid 
unnecessarily burdening protected speech.206  The Court did not assess 
why these were not more reasonable options as McCutcheon requires.207  
                                                 
203 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1458. 
204 See Ognibene, 671 F.3d at 187 (deferring to the City on the proper way to regulate quid 
pro quo corruption given its nebulous scope).  Indeed, this reasonable fit analysis 
underscores that the limits serve an interest in leveling the playing field and equalizing 
voices.  Id. at 200.  The only credible reason a business donor’s contribution might have 
more impact dollar-for-dollar than another, non-business dealing donor, is that she may 
already have access to, and a relationship with, public officials—things beyond the 
contribution itself—that can influence a public official.  Id. at 187.  Attempts to equalize 
influence by offsetting access with contribution limits are expressly disapproved of in 
McCutcheon.  134 S. Ct. at 1450–51. 
205 See Ognibene, 671 F.3d at 196 (explaining that it was for lack of these types of 
regulations that the Second Circuit upheld the ban). 
206 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1456–57. 
207 Such regulations would afford a better, more reasonable fit.  Since the only recognized 
interest for regulating contribution limits is quid pro quo corruption, imposing uniform 
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The existence of more reasonably fitting regulations is especially obvious 
for the matching fund ban and the business entity ban, which extends to 
spouses, domestic partners, employees, and children.  The City allows 
these individuals to contribute at the higher base amount.  If the City 
were genuinely concerned about circumvention, the most immediate 
potential avenue of circumventing would be through family and 
employee contributions.  Yet the City leaves the base limits alone for 
both family and employees, instead banning matching funds and 
business entity contributions.  The City’s failure to address the most 
obvious source of potential circumvention suggests the bans are not a 
reasonable fit, and indeed, that anti-circumvention interests are not the 
true impetus for them.  As with Eddleman, McCutcheon calls Ognibene into 
serious doubt. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
McCutcheon not only substantially changes, but makes more rigorous 
the analysis used in challenges to regulations of contributions for 
independent spending and of direct contributions to candidates.  Both 
types of contribution limits are likely unconstitutional under its 
framework. 
  
                                                                                                             
limits with disclosure requirements and a bribery prohibition with strict penalties for 
incumbents would more reasonably address quid pro quo corruption without unduly 
restricting protected expression and association. 
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